《Bran-New + Memoir of Top Rank CIA Who Helped Create & Implement Counterterrorist Operation And Illuminate The CIA Inner Workings》John Rizzo - COMPANY MAN : Thirty Years of Controversy and Crisis in the CIA
This New York Times bestseller in paperback edition is a bran-new book and nicely wrapped with protective book-wrapper. Noted that there is a minor price-tag removal scratch mark on the rear cover page (Refer to attached photo) The original new book is sold at usual price RM92.57. Now here Only at RM17. From the “most influential career lawyer in CIA history” ( Los Angeles Times) an unprecedented memoir filled with never-before-told stories from his thirty-year career at the center of the U.S. government’s intelligence program (1976-2009). In 1975, fresh out of law school and working a numbing job at the Treasury Department, John Rizzo took “a total shot in the dark” and sent his résumé to the Central Intelligence Agency. He had no notion that more than thirty years later, after serving under eleven CIA directors and seven presidents, he would become a notorious public figure—a symbol and a victim of the toxic winds swirling in post-9/11 Washington. From serving as the point person answering for the Iran-contra scandal to approving the rules that govern waterboarding and other “enhanced interrogation techniques,” John Rizzo witnessed and participated in virtually all of the significant operations of the CIA’s modern history. In Company Man, Rizzo charts the CIA’s evolution from shadowy entity to an organization exposed to new laws, rules, and a seemingly neverending string of public controversies. Rizzo offers a direct window into the CIA in the years after the 9/11 attacks, when he served as the agency’s top lawyer, with oversight of actions that remain the subject of intense debate today. In Company Man, Rizzo is the first CIA official to ever describe what “black sites” look like from the inside and he provides the most comprehensive account ever written of the “torture tape” fiasco surrounding the interrogation of Al Qaeda suspect Abu Zubaydah and the birth, growth, and death of the enhanced interrogation program. Spanning more than three decades, Company Man is the most authoritative insider account of the CIA ever written—a groundbreaking, timely, and remarkably candid history of American intelligence. In 1975, the author, a lawyer working for the U.S. Customs Service, applied—pretty much on a whim—to join the CIA. This fascinating memoir takes us through Rizzo’s three-decade-long career as a CIA lawyer, a career that has included being the liaison between Congress and the CIA during the Iran-Contra affair and becoming an international celebrity—not that he sought such notoriety—through his involvement with the so-called torture tapes, recordings of the alleged torture of an al-Qaeda operative, which were destroyed amid great controversy by the agency. Rizzo’s intimate knowledge of the company’s post-9/11 activities makes his book must reading for today’s political junkies, but he had been with the agency more than 25 years before the 2001 terror attacks, and his portrait of the CIA from the 1970s through the ’90s is fascinating on its own terms, portraying an intelligence organization that was dealing with internal strife and trying to decide how to adapt to stricter new regulations, even as the world was growing into a darker, more frightening place. As insider looks go, this one is about as close-up as you can get. Rizzo covers such incidents as ● the Yuri Nosenko affair, ● the Church Committee, ● Iran-Contra (which put Rizzo on the map, which he describes as “fun as hell”, and which he calls “the best thing that happened to me in my career”), ● the historical origins of written presidential findings to authorize covert action (mandated by Congress and left for Rizzo to figure out), ● the Aldrich Ames case (a particularly gripping part of the book), ● the Wilson/Plame affair, and others. He describes the controversies and media storms surrounding the Agency’s use of “dirty assets” in places like Guatemala, and how these resulted in CIA officers becoming less inclined to recruit them---until, of course, Congress and the media easily derided the CIA’s “risk aversion” following 9/11. He also describes the impossibility of getting any purely lethal operations against bin Laden approved, as well as the more basic problem of obtaining reliable intelligence about bin Laden’s whereabouts and movements. Of course, much of the book deals with the CIA’s post-9/11 rendition, detention and interrogation program. Rizzo writes that information extracted from waterboarding Abu Zubaydah led to the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh, for example (according to the Senate’s report, bin al-Shibh was unexpectedly captured in a raid targeting Hassan Ghul, with no connection between Zubaydah’s reporting and bin al-Shibh’s capture). Another controversy deals with whether or not President Bush was knowledgeable about the program and the techniques used. According to Rizzo, Bush attended none of the Principals Committee meetings on the program (presidents rarely attend such meetings anyway) and Rizzo writes that he is unaware of Bush ever being personally briefed on the program. In his memoirs, Bush asserts that he reviewed the EITs in advance and that he vetoed none of them, even though Justice had already approved their use on Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. Bush also writes that he met with Tenet about the program, although Rizzo is unaware of such meetings, and Tenet told him that he had no such discussions. Rizzo attributes the episode to Bush’s willingness and intent to assume responsibility for the program. While discussing the issue of briefing the congressional oversight committees about the program, Rizzo recalls no objections, and calls the decision to not brief the entire membership “foolish and feckless.” Rizzo also covers, more generally, the CIA’s drone programs and notes the irony of targeted killings generating less outrage from Congress and human rights groups, and less media coverage, than the EITs. He notes the additional irony that targeting terrorists for lethal action was “always a big deal during the Clinton administration,” a turn of events Rizzo finds “perverse.” He notes that drone strikes expanded dramatically under Obama and that human rights groups were drawn to the program partly because they needed a new issue to attack following the end of the RDI program. Rizzo’s treatment of all the figures he interacted with will strike some as too uncritical, although he does not seem to be a fan of the likes of Ron Wyden (“a foe who could not be appeased”) or various others. He is fairly critical of Clinton’s inaction regarding the al-Qaeda threat but says less about Bush’s inaction during his first few month of office. In another passage that critics will love, Rizzo recalls Bush’s public denials of any sort of rendition program: “It’s not that he deliberately lied---I am sure that he did not. Still, his answer wasn’t true.” Rizzo doesn’t even address the question of whether any of the intelligence revealed by the EITs was true or not. Also, some parts of the book seem to strain credulity. Rizzo writes that Porter Goss “never intended” to cover up the destruction of the CIA’s EIT tapes, for example. Still, an insightful, wry and clearly written memoir from a relatively unusual perspective. About the Author John Rizzo had a thirty-four-year career as a lawyer at the CIA, culminating with seven years as the Agency’s chief legal officer. In the post-9/11 era, he helped create and implement the full spectrum of aggressive counterterrorist operations against Al Qaeda, including the so-called “enhanced interrogation program” and lethal strikes against the Al Qaeda leadership. He has served as senior counsel at a Washington DC law firm and is a visiting scholar at the Hoover Institution. He is a graduate of Brown University and George Washington University Law School.
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