《Bran-New + Winner Of The Pulitzer Prize + The New Ways that American is Fighting Wars With CIA Special Operation Force》THE WAY OF THE KNIFE : The CIA, a Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth
This New York Times bestseller in paperback edition is a bran-new book and nicely wrapped with protective book-wrapper. The original new book is sold at usual price RM68.50. Now here Only at RM18 A Pulitzer Prize–winning reporter’s riveting account of the transformation of the CIA and America’s special operations forces into man-hunting and killing machines in the world’s dark spaces: the new American way of war The most momentous change in American warfare over the past decade has taken place away from the battlefields of Afghanistan and Iraq, in the corners of the world where large armies can’t go. The Way of the Knife is the untold story of that shadow war: a campaign that has blurred the lines between soldiers and spies and lowered the bar for waging war across the globe. America has pursued its enemies with killer drones and special operations troops; trained privateers for assassination missions and used them to set up clandestine spying networks; and relied on mercurial dictators, untrustworthy foreign intelligence services, and proxy armies. This new approach to war has been embraced by Washington as a lower risk, lower cost alternative to the messy wars of occupation and has been championed as a clean and surgical way of conflict. But the knife has created enemies just as it has killed them. It has fomented resentments among allies, fueled instability, and created new weapons unbound by the normal rules of accountability during wartime. Mark Mazzetti tracks an astonishing cast of characters on the ground in the shadow war, from a CIA officer dropped into the tribal areas to learn the hard way how the spy games in Pakistan are played to the chain-smoking Pentagon official running an off-the-books spy operation, from a Virginia socialite whom the Pentagon hired to gather intelligence about militants in Somalia to a CIA contractor imprisoned in Lahore after going off the leash. At the heart of the book is the story of two proud and rival entities, the CIA and the American military, elbowing each other for supremacy. Sometimes, as with the raid that killed Osama bin Laden, their efforts have been perfectly coordinated. Other times, including the failed operations disclosed here for the first time, they have not. For better or worse, their struggles will define American national security in the years to come. This book is a great overview of the changing nature of the CIA. Mazzetti chronicles the Agency’s schizophrenic attitude toward its global kill campaign. Mazzetti reveals an interesting shift in the roles of our military and intelligence forces; as the military develops or expands its own capabilities in collecting intelligence on al-Qaeda members, the CIA expands its own capabilities to kill them. For example, the SEALs of DevGru’s Red Squadron were sheep-dipped to the CIA for the bin Laden takedown, since Pakistan is, on paper, a US ally and does not permit us to send military forces into Pakistan, or at least, prefer that we go in with drones. Mazzetti also explains that the CIA’s controversial rendition program was quietly phased out in favor of the CIA drone program. Mazzetti describes how the imperative to protect US troops in Afghanistan from Pakistan-based militants led to a slackening of the standards used to mark terror suspects for drone strikes. After 2008, the CIA won approval for a category of drone attacks known as “signature strikes,” in which, even without a specific target, an attack is justified by a pattern of behavior—young men test-firing mortars at a training camp in Waziristan, say, or riding under arms in atruck toward the Afghan border. Under the laws of war, strikes of that kind are typically legal on a formal battlefield like that in Afghanistan—in war, if an enemy camp is discovered, it is not necessary to have precise intel on it. In secret, Obama unilaterally extended such permission to Pakistan’s border areas, where the United States had never declared war. The President put the CIA, not the Pentagon, in charge of these attacks, in order to maintain plausible deniability. The benefits of the way of the knife are obvious: Few Americans are put at risk and the costs are relatively low in a time of budgetary constraints. But as Mazzetti points out this type of knife fighting is not as surgical as some of its proponents think for it creates enemies just as it has obliterated them. It also has lowered the bar for waging war and it is now easier for the United States to carry out killing operations at the ends of the earth than at any other time in its history.
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